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Abstract
The adaptation of a priori knowledge to new relevant facts and the use of the so
enriched knowledge base for inference and response is the subject of this paper. Here
knowledge processing is realised in a conditional and probabilistic environment under
maximum entropy (MaxEnt) and minimum relative entropy, respectively. It is mea-
surable: the amount of knowledge acquired, the remaining (ﬁrst order) uncertainty, the
inferential strength when focussing things, and the (second order) uncertainty in given
answers, are quantiﬁable as well as the relevance of new facts; they all measure in [bit].
This makes the MaxEnt-probability distribution accessible to clear and substantial in-
terpretations: due to incomplete information about the domain parts of the knowledge
are signiﬁcant or reliable, others are not. And this non-reliability can be identiﬁed and
evaluated. The expert system shell SPIRIT supports this sort of knowledge evaluation,
which is shown by suitable examples.
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1. Introduction
Knowledge processing in a conditional and probabilistic environment under
maximum entropy (MaxEnt) and minimum relative entropy (MinREnt), re-
spectively, seems to be an attractive alternative to more qualitative approaches.
Just to mention a few outstanding contributions of the last two decades: Paris
and Vencovska in [1–3] relate on the MaxEnt and MinREnt (or minimum cross
entropy) inference process; Csiszar [4], Shore and Johnson [5] and Kern-Isb-
erner [6] characterise MaxEnt and MinREnt as the only functional concepts
which guarantee an unbiased adaptation of a probability distribution to new
information––especially in the last paper the results follow from four obvious
axioms; this author in [7] shows the intrinsic uncertainty and uncertainty
change to be the same in any conditional basic set and to equal entropy and
relative entropy, respectively.
So convincing arguments let the MaxEnt-community grow, but there is still
one problem with this concept causing uneasiness: the ambiguity in the Max-
Ent-distributions interpretation and in the deduced answers to queries. If we
learn that birds always ﬂy (ﬂyjbird [1.]) the MaxEnt-distribution on the binary
variables Bird¼ bird, bird and Fly¼ ﬂy, fly conﬁgurations attributes proba-
bility 1/3 to the event Bird¼ bird. Of course this should not result in the
misleading conclusion that 33% of all objects were birds. Even more: We feel
that this percentage is absolutely not reliable. Only if more relevant informa-
tion would enter the system we might be able to give a more signiﬁcant answer
to the query: What is the probability of an object to be a bird?
MaxEnt-distributions contain reliable and less reliable (conditional) prob-
abilities, and this is natural in view of incomplete information about the do-
main. But how to detect such non-reliability or second-order uncertainty? And
if this second order uncertainty is high, which additional information could
reduce it. What is the relevance of further knowledge pieces to improve the
answers reliability?
In Section 2 we brieﬂy relate on mathematical and logical preliminaries and
the MaxEnt-inference process as it is realised in the expert system shell
SPIRIT, cf., [8,9]; in Section 3.1 we justify the MaxEnt/MinREnt principle as
an unbiased form of knowledge processing and in Section 3.2 we provide re-
spective measures of knowledge and the remaining ﬁrst order uncertainty,
of the inferential strength when focussing things, and of this focus impact on
the answer. All these quantities measure in [bit]. Section 3.3 introduces the
concept of second order uncertainty, and for some small examples this un-
certainty is calculated. We then deﬁne the relevance of additional informa-
tion about the domain, give a middle size example, and in Section 3.4 close
with a ﬁnal discussion. Section 4 is a resume and shows up lines of further
research.
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2. Conditionals and probabilistic knowledge processing
2.1. Preliminaries
Let L be a propositional language, built from a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite-valued
variables V ¼ fV1; . . . ; Vng with values vj of Vj. Propositions of L are formed by
literals Vj ¼ vj, by the junctors ^ (and), _ (or),  (not) and by respective pa-
rentheses; such propositions are denoted by upper case letters A;B;C; . . . To
simplify notation we juxtapose conjuncts, i.e. AB ¼ A ^ B. Complete or simple
conjunctions of literals we write as unordered tuples such as v ¼ v1; . . . ; vn or vI ,
vJ , vK , respectively, with I , J , K being subsets of f1; . . . ; ng. Note that such a vI
is a special proposition and might be true or false for respective interpretations
of L. V is the set of all complete conjunctions v and jVj its cardinality.
Consider a binary conditional operator, j. Formulas of the form BjA are
called conditionals or rules, they build the language LjL. Note again that vJ jvI is
a special conditional which can be true, false or inapplicable for respective
interpretations of L [10]. Without loss of generality we assume I \ J ¼ ; for
such special conditionals. Propositions A 2 L are identiﬁed with conditionals
AjT where T is any tautology.
To propositional and conditional formulas real number x 2 ½0; 1 are as-
signed, representing probabilities. So the syntax consists of objects of the type
BjA ½x, B, A 2 L and x 2 ½0; 1. As to the semantics, a model is a probability
distribution P on L. P satisﬁes a conditional BjA ½x, P  BjA ½x, iﬀ P ðBAÞ ¼
x  P ðAÞ.
2.2. Knowledge acquisition, query and response
In what follows we show how by means of conditionals and the MinREnt-
principle knowledge is inferred, how this knowledge serves as a basis for fur-
ther inference once an evident situation forces us to focus it, and how a
question can be answered in the light of this focus. The whole process ﬁnds a
sound justiﬁcation in the papers [1–6], already quoted in Section 1. The the-
oretical considerations are accompanied by a little example which will be
continued later on, to study ﬁrst and second order uncertainty and their re-
spective measures.
(a) Deﬁnition of the knowledge domain
We choose the variables Vl and their respective values vl, providing the set of
all complete conjunctions. With LjL we dispose of an adequate communication
tool.
(b) Knowledge acquisition
The expert knows facts about the domain. Such facts are conditionals and
their respective probabilities R ¼ fBijAi ½xi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; Ig Each xi expresses the
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probability of the conditional to be true in the domain, either of statistical or of
subjective nature. We calculate a distribution, P , which adapts a given prior P
to the above facts in R. P and P  are considered epistemic states on the domain.
For the ﬁrst adaptation the prior often is the uniform distribution P 0, which
represents ignorance. The adaptation takes place by solving
P  ¼ argminRðQ; P 0Þ; s:t: Q  R: ð1Þ
R is the relative or cross entropy between Q and P 0. Eq. (1) calculates the
epistemic state P  which respects all conditional information, and minimises
directed divergence from ignorance P 0. For a justiﬁcation of (1) cf. again the
above quoted papers. Please keep in mind that RðQ; P 0Þ ¼ ldjVj  HðQÞ ¼
HðP 0Þ  HðQÞ, being H the entropy. Therefore, minimizing R (MinREnt) and
maximizing H (MaxEnt) for the prior P 0 is the same. For the algorithmic so-
lution of (1) each restriction Q  BijAi½xi is transformed into the equivalent
linear equation QðBiAiÞð1 xiÞ  QðBiAiÞxi ¼ 0. More on the algorithm in [8,9].
The convergence of the there described generalised iterative proportional ﬁt-
ting is proved in [11].
(c) Query
The query consists of three parts: a focus plus a question, the adaptation to
the focus, and ﬁnally the answer.
(ca) Focus and question
The focus is a temporary (complex) condition, to which P  shall be sub-
mitted. In its richest form it is again a set of probabilistic conditionals
E ¼ fFjjEj½yj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; Jg. In its weakest form it is just one certain condition
‘‘given that F is true’’: E ¼ fF ½1:0g. In either case P  must be submitted to this
focus.
A question is a conditional to be evaluated: H jG ¼ ?
The query as focus plus question is the invitation to reﬂect the question in
the light of the knowledge P  and the focussed situation. To do so it needs an
adaptation of P  to E.
(cb) Adapting to the focus
The adaptation of P  to the focussed situation is done by solving
P  ¼ argminRðQ; P Þ; s:t: Q  E: ð2Þ
Eq. (2) is solvable only if there exists a feasible distribution, totally continuous
with respect to P . In the remainder of this paper we assume this to be true, so
as to make the focussed situation always consistent with the epistemic state P .
(cc) Answer
We calculate
P ðH jGÞ ¼ z; ð3Þ
z is the answer to the question H jG ¼ ?
206 W. R€odder / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 33 (2003) 203–218
The following example shows a little knowledge domain and goes through
the steps (a)–(c) as presented above.
Example 1 (Penguin population, knowledge domain, knowledge acquisition,
query).
(Ad a) The three variables and their respective values are: to be a bird or not
Bird ¼ bi, bi; to be a penguin or not Penguin ¼ pe, pe; to be able to ﬂy
or not Fly ¼ fl, fl. The domain contains 8 complete conjunctions:
from bi pe fl to bi pe fl. A typical element of LjL is fljðbi peÞ.
(Ad b) The ornithologist knows the facts that, penguins are birds (100%), birds
in general ﬂy (98%), but penguins very likely do not ﬂy (0.1%)––not
more and not less! The respective probabilistic conditionals read bijpe
[1.0], fljbi [0.98], fljpe [0.001]. Now solving (1) yields the following P :
The 36% probability of an object to be a bird needs an interpreta-
tion, no such fact was provided by the ornithologist and if it is not
deducible from the given conditionals it is not reliable. More on that in
Section 3.3.
(Ad c) We observe an object which very likely (80%) is a bird but not a pen-
guin. What is its probability to ﬂy? We focus bi pe [0.8] and put the un-
conditioned question fl ¼ ? The adaptation to the focus yields the
following contingency table P :
As we expected, the ability to ﬂy under the virtual focus turns out to
be more likely than in general, namely 89%. (Of course the answer in
the shell SPIRIT must not be evaluated from a contingency table, but is
provided directly.)
In Section 3.1 we link the ideas of conditioning, information, relative entropy
and uncertainty. With these concepts a sound measurement of acquired
knowledge, inferential strength, impact of the focus upon the question and of
ad hoc knowledge is possible. This will be shown in Section 3.2.
Conjunction Probability Conjunction Probability
bi pe fl 0.0000036 bi pe fl 0.0000000
bi pe fl 0.0036074 bi pe fl 0.0000000
bi pe fl 0.3514979 bi pe fl 0.3206625
bi pe fl 0.0035661 bi pe fl 0.3206625
Conjunction Probability Conjunction Probability
bi pe bi 0.0000011 bi pe fl 0.0000000
bi bi fl 0.0011187 bi pe fl 0.0000000
bi pe fl 0.7919651 bi pe fl 0.0994401
bi pe fl 0.0080349 bi pe fl 0.0994401
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3. Measures in MinREnt knowledge processing
3.1. Inference principles
The solution P  of (1) in Section 2.2 respects two important principles:
• the principle of conditional preservation,
• the principle of uncertainty preservation.
Either of these principles is a good reason to accept P  as the only epistemic
state inferred from the facts R. Let us discuss this further and then add
• the principle of cautious choice.
In [6] and in [12, Section 5], the author develops that P  is the only correct
adaptation of P 0 to R once we accept four axioms the most important of which
is the axiom of conditional preservation. Divergence of conditional dependencies
in an epistemic state Q from those in P is shown to be RðQ; P Þ, and then the
utmost preservation of prior conditional dependencies under adaptation is
claimed. Keep in mind that without this axiom minimising the objective func-
tion in (1) is in vain.
In [7, Theorem 2], the author develops that relative entropy RðQ; P Þ in a
conditional probabilistic environment measures average uncertainty change.
Average uncertainty in P is shown to be the same for all representative sets of
conditionals, so called conditional basic sets. Average uncertainty change
comes from altering the semantic model P to Q. Information ﬁdelity then is
uncertainty preservation: Under adaptation prior average uncertainty shall be
preserved as far as possible. Keep in mind that without this principle mini-
mising the objective function in (1) is in vain.
Either principle, preservation of conditional structure and preservation of
uncertainty is essential for MinREnt-inference.
Knowledge is the mutual determination of propositions by propositions.
The better we can conclude propositions from others, the more we know. In a
probabilistic model this reads: The more in average conditioned probabilities in
a distribution tend to be zero or one, the higher is knowledge. The lower the
capability of establishing plausible connections between propositions, the
lower is knowledge.
Knowledge in a model P is high if average uncertainty for any conditional
basic set is low. The less the expected uncertainty reduction from learning such
conditionals to be true the more we know [7].
But then why accept the preservation principles? Why not change the
probabilistic conditional structure or the respective uncertainty structure fas-
ter? To violate either one of these principles means also to violate the principle
of cautious choice. This is what the remainder of this section is about.
Once we adapt the epistemic state P 0 to facts R1 ¼ R like in (1) of Section 2
to ﬁnd P 1 , is this adaptation cautious with respect to future adaptation steps?
More formally:
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Let R1 ¼ fBijAi ½xi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; I1g and R2 ¼ fBijAi ½xi; i ¼ I1 þ 1; . . . ; I2g be
two subsequently provided sets of facts and let R ¼ R1 [ R2. Is it true that the
choice of the epistemic state P 1 is a cautious anticipation of the future update
by R2:
P 2 ¼ argminRðQ; P 1 Þ; s:t: Q  R: ð4Þ
The following deﬁnition formalises what a cautious choice of an epistemic state
is about.
Deﬁnition 1 (Cautious choice). Let R1 be a set of facts and let CH be a function
which chooses a unique element out of fQ : Q  R1g, the set of all R1-satisfying
Q. Then P ¼ CHðR1Þ is a cautious choice, if for all R2 and R ¼ R1 [ R2 there
always exists a Q  R with RðQ; P 0ÞPRðP ; P 0Þ.
In other words: The choice P must be such that at least one possible model
for the richer R diﬀers more from P 0 than P does. This reﬂects our under-
standing of knowledge growth. Knowledge cannot grow in an adequate
manner, if the ﬁrst knowledge adaptation was incautious. The MinREnt-
principle is cautious, which we now put as a theorem.
Theorem 1 (MinREnt is cautious choice). The only cautious choice CHðR1Þ for
any R1 is P 1 ¼ argminRðQ; P 0Þ, s.t. Q  R1.
Proof. First we relate that (4) and the following optimisation problem (5) yield
the same solution:
P 2 ¼ argminRðQ; P 0Þ; s:t: Q  R: ð5Þ
This equivalence was shown in [11] and in a less abstract form in [13],
Lemma 2.4. Either adaptation of ignorance P 0 to R ¼ R1 [ R2 or of P 1 to
R ¼ R1 [ R2 yields the same result P 2 .
Now assume P 0 6¼ P 1 to be a cautious choice and construct R2 in such a way
that R ¼ R1 [ R2 fully determines P 1 . For this R––which is richer than R1––we
have RðP 1 ; P 0Þ < RðP 0; P 0Þ. As P 1 by construction is the only R-satisfying dis-
tribution, this contradicts cautiousness.
Cautious anticipation of future information is obligatory. There is no way
for a faster knowledge gain than that performed by MinREnt.
3.2. Knowledge, knowledge amount, inferential strength and impact
In Section 2.2 we developed in (a) the deﬁnition of the knowledge domain, in
(b) the knowledge acquisition, and in (c) the query. Now we show the mea-
surability of the whole process.
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In Section 3.1 knowledge gain was characterised as conditional dependency
change or likewise as uncertainty change. As long as we dispose of the facts R,
only, a measurement of such quantities is impossible due to the complex mu-
tual dependencies between all linear equations involved. But once we solved (1)
and dispose of P  knowledge and uncertainty become measurable. The reader
is asked to apply this reasoning likewise to the solution P  of (2).
Deﬁnition 2 (Knowledge, ad hoc knowledge, focus strength, focus impact).
(i) Let P  be the solution of (1). Then
 P  is knowledge and RðP ; P 0Þ ¼ HðP 0Þ  HðP Þ ½bit
is the knowledge amount: ð6Þ
Knowledge amount corresponds to the information the system received.
 HðP Þ ¼ HðP 0Þ  RðP ; P 0Þ ½bit
is the remaining ðfirst orderÞ uncertainty: ð7Þ
(ii) Let P  be the solution of (2). Then
 P  is ad hoc knowledge and RðP ; P 0Þ ¼ HðP 0Þ  HðP Þ ½bit
is ad hoc knowledge amount: ð8Þ
Ad hoc knowledge amount is the information the system received about
the focussed situation.
 HðP Þ ¼ HðP 0Þ  RðP ; P 0Þ ½bit
is the remaining ðfirst orderÞ uncertainty in the focussed situation:
ð9Þ
ðiiiÞ Let P  and P  be as in ð1Þ and ð2Þ: Then RðP ; P Þ ½bit
is the focus strength: ð10Þ
(iv) Let P  and P  be as in (1) and (2); let H jG ¼ ? be a conditioned question.
Then
RððP ðH jGÞ; P ðH jGÞÞ; ðP ðH jGÞ; P ðH jGÞÞÞ ½bit
is the impact of the focus upon the question: ð11Þ
Before exemplifying all these quantities for the penguin example some
comments on Deﬁnition 2 might be helpful.
(Ad i)ii The system received the information RðP ; P 0Þ [bit]. The average
uncertainty reduced from HðP 0Þ to HðP 0Þ  RðP ; P 0Þ ¼ HðP Þ. The
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received information is relative to the initial epistemic state, of
course. For a prior P 6¼ P 0 the resulting epistemic state and the re-
ceived information would diﬀer. Consider the special case P ¼ P .
Here both, the knowledge increase and the received information
vanish.
(Ad ii)| RðP ; P 0Þ measures the probabilistic conditional structure change
from P 0 to P . Knowledge amount in P  can be greater, equal or
even less than that in P . The latter corroborates our intuition,
that sometimes you dispose of the wrong knowledge with respect
to a special focus. The focus weakens the general knowledge, so to
speak.
(Ad iii) RðP ; P Þ is the information theoretical eﬀect which the special focus
puts on P . It is the ‘‘intellectual eﬀort’’ someone needs to focus things
this way.
(Ad iv) The impact might be zero if the focus does not alter the conditional
probability of the question. The higher the impact the more the fo-
cussed epistemic state inﬂuences the answer.
Example 2 (Penguin population, measuring the inference process).
(Ad i) The acquired knowledge P  in Example 1a) was given as a contin-
gency table. The entropy H of this distribution counts 1.6409 [bit],
the knowledge amount RðP ;P 0Þ ¼ HðP 0Þ HðP Þ ¼ 3 1:6409 [bit]¼
1.3591 [bit].
(Ad ii)| Please go back to Example 1(b) and see the there given contingency
table of P . This distributions entropy H counts 0.999 [bit], ad
hoc knowledge amounts to RðP ; P 0Þ ¼ HðP 0Þ  HðP Þ ¼ 3 0:999
[bit]¼ 2.001 [bit].
(Ad iii) For the focus bi pe [0.8] in Example 1c) the strength counts 1.27
[bit].
(Ad iv) The impact upon the question in Example 1(c) measures 0.185 [bit].
The information ﬂows in the MaxEnt and MinREnt-inference process
are measurable and in particular is the knowledge amount acquired in a
basis. This has far-reaching consequences for such bases which model busi-
ness decision problems in that it allows a validation of their quality: the
more knowledge in the base the better the decision. For such a model
counting more that 80 variables and more than 1300 probabilistic condi-
tionals cf. [14].
3.3. Reliability and relevance
Once we solved (2) in Section 2.2 and evaluate (3) we get a unique
z ¼ P ðH jGÞ, the answer to the question H jG ¼ ? under the focus E. This
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answer might or might not be reliable, due to incomplete information about the
knowledge domain. So in Example 1, the answer to the question bi ¼ ? (under
an empty focus) is. 36, and this result is supposed to be not reliable at all. On
the other hand, the. 98 answer to the question fljbi ¼ ? is absolutely reliable, as
it is a mere repetition of an adapted fact.
Mathematically speaking, each acquired fact from R, BijAi½xi, is a linear
equation of the form
QðBiAiÞð1 xiÞ  QðBiAiÞxi ¼ ð1 xiÞ 
X
vBiAi
QðvÞ  xi 
X
vBiAi
QðvÞ ¼ 0;
cf. the end of Section 2.1. These linear equations together with the non-nega-
tivity restrictions and the normalisation of Q on L build a convex polyhedron in
probability space which in general counts inﬁnite many distributions rather
than one, only. Future facts about the domain are additional equations which
reduce the polyhedron and alter P  and P , in general. Non-reliability comes
from missing (additional) facts about the knowledge domain. Once the set of
conditionals R is so rich that it determines a unique Q  R, all non-reliability
vanishes. But this is not the case under incomplete information.
Fortunately under certain circumstances we can calculate an interval in
which the answer to the question H jG ¼ ? under a focus E must fall, even after
arbitrary future additional information. This interval is an indicator for the
actual non-reliability or second order uncertainty of the answer.
For an arbitrary focus E ¼ fFjjEj ½yj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; Jg the second order un-
certainty interval is beyond a numerical calculability, because of the complex
process P 0!R P !E P ðH jGÞ. On principle, every feasible Q  R must be trans-
formed into a P Q and then evaluated for H jG : P Q ðH jGÞ. All such P Q ðH jGÞ
span the unknown interval. For a certain focus second order uncertainty can be
grasped, however.
Deﬁnition 3 (second order uncertainty). Let R, H jG ¼ ? be as in (1), (3) in
Section 2.2 and let E ¼ fF jT ½1:0g be a certain focus. Solve the optimisation
problems
u ¼ minQðQjGF Þ s:t: Q  R ð12Þ
and
u ¼ maxQðH jGF Þ s:t: Q  R: ð13Þ
Then ½u; u is the second order uncertainty interval and m ¼ ld u ðld uÞ
the answers second order uncertainty, it measures in [bit].
Note that evaluating H jG under a certain focus F jT [1.0] is equivalent to
evaluating H jGF . So u is the minimal and u is the maximal value for the
conditionals H jG probability under the focus. If QðH jGF Þ ¼ uðuÞ and if we
then learn that H jGF is true we receive -lduðuÞ [bit] information. So m is the
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maximum diﬀerence of still possible uncertainty reduction, a suitable measure
for the answers non-reliability.
Eqs. (12) and (13) are linear fractional optimisation problems. The actual
SPIRIT version provides to any answer the uncertainty interval and the re-
spective uncertainty measure.
Example 3 (Second order uncertainty).
(i)ii Implication: R ¼ fBjA ½1:0g, E ¼ ;, H jG  B. We get ½u; u ¼ ½0; 1;
m ¼ ld0 ðld1Þ ¼ 1 [bit]. The result meets our intuition, in that the
mere implication leaves the occurrence of B second order uncertain as
long as A is uncertain. The answer P ðBÞ ¼ P ðBÞ ¼ z ¼ 2=3 is not reliable
at all.
Modus ponens: R ¼ fBjA ½1:0g, E ¼ fA ½1:0g, H jG  B. We get ½u; u ¼
½1; 1; m ¼ ld1 ðld1Þ ¼ 0 [bit]. The second order uncertainty disap-
pears with a certain A. The answer P ðBÞ ¼ z ¼ 1 is absolutely reliable.
(ii)i Contraposition: R ¼ fBjA ½1:0g, E ¼ ;, H jG  AjB. We get ½u; u ¼ ½0; 1;
m ¼ ld0 ðld1Þ ¼ 1 [bit]. This results form the case QðABÞ ¼ 1. Ver-
ify that here both, QðBjAÞ and QðAjBÞ, are degenerated and assume any
value in the interval [0,1]. The answer P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBÞ ¼ z ¼ 1 is not
reliable at all.
Modus tollens: R ¼ fBjA ½1:0g, E ¼ fB ½1:0g, H jG  A. We get ½u; u ¼
½1; 1; m ¼ ld1 ðld1Þ ¼ 0 [bit]. In the presence of a certain B, A can be
deduced by contraposition. The answer P ðAÞ ¼ 1 is absolutely reliable.
(iii) fR ¼ BjAC [0.8], BjACg [0.6], E ¼ fA ½1:0g. We get ½u; u ¼ ½0:6; 0:8;
m ¼ ld0:6 ðld0:8Þ ¼ 0:415 [bit]. Conditioning B under A and then
under C and under C forces the conditional probability of B into [0.6,
0.8]. The answers P ðBÞ ¼ z ¼ 0:662 reliability lacks 0.415 [bit].
(iv) Here we reconsider Example 1 of Section 2.2. From the facts that pen-
guins are birds (100%), that birds in general ﬂy (98%) and that pen-
guins very likely do not ﬂy (0.1%) we derived an epistemic state in
which 36% of all objects are birds. This is not reliable at all. With the
above facts R and with E ¼ ;, H jG  Bi ¼ bi we get ½u; u ¼ ½0; 1;
m ¼ ld1 ðld0Þ ¼ 1 [bit]. This result meets our intuition, of course.
The facts R can be realised in distributions with an arbitrary percentage
of birds!
The following example is somewhat more sophisticated. It goes back to [15]
and was already analysed with the expert system shell SPIRIT in [16,17]. We
brieﬂy repeat it here and then treat reliability problems.
Example 4 (Reliability on Lea Sombe). The society in which Lea Sombe lives
is characterised by four variables: To be a student or not (S ¼ yjn), to be young
or not (Y ¼ yjn), to have marital status single, married or corporate life
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(M ¼ s=m=c), to be parent or not (P ¼ yjn). The facts we know about this
society are:
• 90% of students are young, Y ¼ yjS ¼ y [0.9],
• 80% of young people are singles, M ¼ sjY ¼ y [0.8],
• 70% of singles are young, Y ¼ yjM ¼ s [0.7],
• 30% of young people study, S ¼ yjY ¼ y [0.3],
• somebody who lives in corporate life, with a probability of 80% is young,
Y ¼ yjM ¼ c [0.8],
• students with children very probably (90%) are not singles, M ¼ sjS ¼
y ^ P ¼ y [0.1].
With these facts R, with E ¼ fS ¼ y ^ P ¼ y ½1:0g, H jG  Y ¼ y we ask the
system: If Lea Sombe is student and has a child, is she young? The answer is
P ðY ¼ yÞ ¼ z ¼ 0:81; very likely Lea Sombe is young. But this answer is little
reliable. We get ½u; u ¼ ½0; 1 and m ¼ 1 [bit]. Still all answers diﬀerent from
0.81 are possible within the society characterised by the facts R, due to in-
complete information.
A second question is: If we know about Lea Sombe, that she is a single
student, how likely is she young? This time the answer is P ðY ¼ yÞ ¼ z ¼ 0:95.
The likelihood to be young did not only increase, but also the reliability grew:
½u; u ¼ ½0:75; 1, m ¼ 0:42 [bit]. The marital status single among students evi-
dences youth better than motherhood does!
Second order uncertainty can be measured in [bit], as was demonstrated by a
great number of suitable examples. We now study relevance. New facts about
the population are relevant for a query, if the answers reliability increases.
More precisely: New facts usually diminish entropy and augment knowledge.
But is this knowledge relevant for a certain query E, H jG ¼ ? And if it is,
this does not necessarily mean relevance for another query E0, H 0jG0 ¼ ?, of
course.
Before we give a deﬁnition of relevance we study Lea Sombes society fur-
ther.
Example 5 (Relevant facts about Lea Sombe). In addition to the facts R ¼ R1
about Lea Sombes society, cf. Example 4, we learn that
• 15% of all students have children, R2 ¼ fP ¼ yjS ¼ y ½0:15g.
Equipped with the knowledge R ¼ R1 [ R2 we again realise the queries from
Example 1.
• E ¼ fS ¼ y ^ P ¼ y ½1:0g, H jG  Y ¼ y and
• E0 ¼ fS ¼ y ^M ¼ s ½1:0g, H jG  Y ¼ y.
The answers are P ðY ¼ yÞ ¼ z ¼ :81 for E and P ðY ¼ yÞ ¼ z ¼ :95 for E0;
they did not change! But what changed signiﬁcantly are ½u; u ¼ ½1=3; 1 with
m ¼ 1:58 [bit] and ½u0; u0 ¼ ½0:79; 1 with m0 ¼ 0:35 [bit] for the ﬁrst and the
second query, respectively. The additional fact R2 decreased second order
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uncertainty from m ¼ 1 [bit] to m ¼ 1:58 [bit] and from m0 ¼ 0:424 [bit] to
m0 ¼ 0:35 [bit].
Based on Example 5 we are ready to deﬁne relevance for any R1, R2, E,
H jG ¼ ? with E ¼ fF jT ½1:0g.
Deﬁnition 4 (Relevance). Let m1 be the second order uncertainty for R ¼ R1,
H jG ¼ ? and E like in Deﬁnition 3. Let m12 be the second order uncertainty for
R ¼ R1 [ R2, H jG ¼ ? and E. Then m1  m12 is the relevance of R2 for the
question H jG ¼ ? under the focus E and under the prior knowledge inferred
from R1, relevance measures in [bit].
Of course for two alternative sets of facts R2, R
0
2, we can even decide which
one is more relevant for R1, E, H jG ¼ ? This gives rise to information evalu-
ation concepts which will be presented in a forthcoming paper.
3.4. Pleading for non-reliable probabilities
In the preceding sections knowledge acquisition, inference and the focus
impact on the answer were shown to be measurable as well as second order
uncertainty and its reduction by relevant information. Because of the proximity
of those concepts to information theory all the quantities measure in [bit].
Lea Sombe, a student mother was estimated as young with a high proba-
bility, namely 81%. Even though this answer suﬀered a second order uncer-
tainty of 1 [bit], see last section, we are convinced, however, that the reader
apportions the 81% some signiﬁcance. Making use of all disposable and adding
no not intended information we must accept the estimated 81%. Only further
facts might convince us to give up our conviction.
There are eﬀects of MaxEnt inference which are harder to believe as was
mentioned already in Section 1, where the MaxEnt-probability 1/3 of an object
to be a bird, was characterised as absolutely not reliable. For a new discussion
of this problem let us now abstract from real propositions like to be a bird or to
ﬂy. They might prejudice the acceptance of logically correct results due to
hidden background information.
If about a population of objects with properties B and A we learn BjA [1.0],
the resulting MaxEnt distribution P  is (1/3, 0, 1/3, 1/3) on the conjunctions
(BA, BA, BA, BA), and hence P ðAÞ ¼ 1=3. The probability decreased from 1/2
under uniform distribution to 1/3 and this causes uneasiness for many critics.
Please mind the following reasoning, however. With BjA [1.0] nothing is
informed about the conditioned probabilities given A. A good reason to
cautiously choose equal probabilities for BA and BA. Modus ponens BjA [1.0],
E ¼ fA ½1:0g and modus tollens AjB [1.0], E ¼ fB ½1:0g are equivalent, cf.
Example 3 in the last section. With AjB [1.0] nothing is informed about the
probabilities given B. A good reason to cautiously choose equal probabilities
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for AB and AB. So consequently all probabilities of BA, BA, BA are the same
and hence P  as above is correct. If all As are Bs, the probability of A should be
1/3. The reliability of this fact is none, of course, but on the actual knowledge
background 1/3 it is the best choice.
As an interesting side-eﬀect of this reasoning we notice that with A be-
coming true, under P 0 the uncertainty about B remains unchanged whereas
under P  this uncertainty vanishes. This qualitative statement in the context
of the present paper can be speciﬁed further. Learning A to become true,
under P 0 reduces the ﬁrst order uncertainty by the amount of ldð1=2Þ ¼ 1
[bit].
Learning A to become true, under P  reduces the ﬁrst order uncertainty by
the amount of ldð1=3Þ ¼ 1:58 [bit]. Now A is more ‘‘informative’’, as B also
becomes true.
Both, the probabilistic and the information theoretical approach meet our
intuition.
4. Resume and future work
MaxEnt and MinREnt inference combines conditional logic with a cautious
probabilistic knowledge acquisition concept. Once facts are provided and
condensed in a MaxEnt-distribution P , a desired answer to a conditioned
question H jG ¼ ? can be derived under an arbitrary focus. This and the rich
conditional language make this kind of knowledge processing a powerful in-
strument.
The knowledge amount acquired, the still remaining uncertainty in P , the
inferential strength when focussing a situation, the impact which this focus puts
a upon the answer, all these magnitudes are measurable in the information
theoretical unit [bit]. The same holds for the non-reliability or second order
uncertainty of an answer due to incomplete information, and for the relevance
of supplemental facts provided to reduce this non-reliability.
The facts provided are a crucial point for the ﬁrst order uncertainty in P 
and the second order uncertainty about P . So a well-structured learning
process is essential for the resulting knowledge gain and the reliability of future
answers. Once information packages about the knowledge domain are avail-
able at an ‘‘information market’’ they even can be ordered with respect to their
relevance concerning expected queries. Information acquisition should be ob-
jective oriented, so as signiﬁcantly to improve the answers reliability. First
results on this subject are given in [18]. If information packages serve as a
means to improve reliability in economical decision problems, we might even
want to estimate a fair price for such packages.
Even more, the knowledge base P  itself might detect vagueness in answers
to possible queries and require relevant additional information from the hu-
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man expert. Such a knowledge base is intelligent in that it shows curiosity
about itself.
This is what future work is concerned about.
MaxEnt and MinREnt inference is available at the expert system shell
SPIRIT. The shell allows to process hundreds of probabilistic facts on umpteen
variables. The variables attributes might be associated with real numbers
(utilities). Calculating expected utilities the shell permits to model decision
problems. In [14] the author relates on a competitiveness evaluation model for a
leadingGerman steel company, including 1300 rules andmore than 80 variables.
The reader interested in the shell SPIRIT might visit our homepage
www.fernuni-hagen.de/BWLOR.
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